America's Second Housing Boom by Edward M. Gramlich
The American landscape changed dra-
matically after World War II, as home-
ownership rates rose from 45 percent to 
65 percent in little more than a decade. 
This burst was fueled by the opening of
mortgage credit and ownership to the mid-
dle class, symbolized by the now-classic 
30-year fixed-rate mortgage. Millions of
American households were able to pur-
chase their split-level homes in the suburbs
and send their children to the public
schools there.
Low- and moderate-income house-
holds were generally excluded from this
earlier movement. Either they could not get
mortgage credit at all, or could not afford
the down payment or monthly payments.
Minority families often faced discrimina-
tion on top of these other factors. As a con-
sequence, the national homeownership rate
stabilized at about 65 percent for 35 years
(figure 1).
But recently, homeownership again
expanded. The share of Americans who
owned homes rose from 64 percent in 1994
to 69 percent by 2005 (figure 2). This time
the new homeowners were largely low-
and moderate-income groups, and minori-
ties. Over the decade, the homeownership
rate in the lowest tenth of the income 
scale rose 4 percentage points to 43 per-
cent, the second lowest rose 4 percentage
points to 49 percent, and the rates for
blacks and Hispanics rose 7 and 8 percent-
age points, respectively, to 49 percent.
About 12 million new homeowners have
emerged, roughly half of them blacks,
Hispanics, and others of mixed race. The
overall rate of 69 percent moves the United
States into the top rung in world home-
ownership rates.
The Subprime Mortgage Market
While the first surge in ownership involved
the prime mortgage market, the second
surge has been largely fueled by the devel-
opment of the subprime mortgage market.
This subprime market can render down
payments as low as zero. Subprime bor-
rowers have lower incomes and inconsis-
tent credit histories, forcing them to pay
high interest rates, sometimes double-digit
interest rates, to get their loans. Points and
fees are higher for subprime mortgages and
prepayment penalties are almost universal,
making it much more costly for borrowers
to get out of subprime mortgage loans.
This subprime mortgage market is a
reasonably new financing option. Subprime
mortgage originations were a mere $35 bil-
lion in 1994, less than 5 percent of total 
mortgage originations. By 2005, subprime
originations had risen to $625 billion 
(figure 3), now up to 20 percent of total
originations and 7 percent of the total out-
standing mortgage stock. Over the decade,
subprime originations increased 17-fold, 
a whopping 26 percent annual rate of
increase.
Just as the middle classes did at the
close of World War II, these new low- and
moderate-income homeowners now have a
chance to build wealth, invest in their
neighborhoods, have their children attend
better schools, and reap other advantages
of homeownership. Both presidents Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush have engaged
in significant cheerleading for the growth
in homeownership. At this point most of
the cheerleading has been from the bully
pulpit, since there has been very little 
new federal money behind the growth in
homeownership.
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But any social change this large is
likely to have some mixed blessings.
Overall delinquency rates for subprime
mortgages are on the order of 7 percent, 
10 times as high as the normal rate in the
prime market (Joint Center 2006). Various
indicators suggest that another 10 percent
of subprime borrowers could be flirting
with credit problems, even if not in 
actual delinquency or foreclosure status
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FIGURE 1.  Homeownership Rates, 1940–2005 (percent)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
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FIGURE 2.  Homeownership Rates, 1970–2005 (percent)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
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(Schloemer et al. 2006). And foreclosures
have likely been held down by the recent
period of very low short-term interest rates
and the proliferation of financing instru-
ments that take advantage of these rates.
Now that short-term rates establish more
normal levels, interest payment burdens
for many subprime borrowers are rising
sharply, and further increases in delin-
quencies and foreclosures are almost sure
to follow.
Indeed, early reports show exactly that
happening in late 2006. Three subprime
lenders have recently declared bankruptcy,
and an intensive study of six million re-
cently made subprime mortgages fore-
casts sharply higher foreclosure rates
(Schloemer et al. 2006). The numbers are
not large enough to threaten the macro-
economy, but even a small rise in fore-
closures could damage the prospects of
millions of low- and moderate-income
households.
The Role of House Prices
House prices play an ambiguous role in
this story. When house prices rise at
healthy rates, as they have until just
recently, borrowers make capital gains on
their homes and build wealth. If they get in
trouble with their mortgages, they can just
sell their houses, pay their prepayment
penalties, and walk away from the whole
problem. Or they can refinance their mort-
gages on favorable terms.
Yet, the rise in house prices, combined
with slow growth in low-income wages, has
led to significant gaps in the stock of afford-
able housing. Nearly half of all households
in the bottom quarter of the income scale
now spend more than 50 percent of their
income on housing, and another quarter
spend between 30 and 50 percent of their
income (Joint Center 2006, table A.6, 36).
With housing expenditures at this rate,
households have little left to spend on other
things, and whether they buy or rent, they
are likely to experience financial difficulties.
Consequently, the latest slackening in
house price appreciation rates could have
ambiguous impacts. Foreclosure problems
might worsen or, perhaps, shortages of
affordable housing might become less 
serious.
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FIGURE 3.  Mortgage Originations, 1994–2005
Source: Mortgage Statistical Annual.
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What Caused the Changes?
Several factors opened up housing mar-
kets. One clear factor is the disappearance
of usury laws against unreasonable or
excessively high interest rates. The
Depository Institutions Deregulatory and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 abolished
usury laws on first mortgages, and states
followed the federal lead and eliminated
many of their own usury laws throughout
the 1980s. Borrowers with inferior credit
histories previously denied credit have
become much more likely to qualify 
for subprime mortgage loans, perhaps
even for prime mortgage loans. Reflect-
ing this fact, mortgage denial rates,
reported under the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act, have dropped noticeably
(figure 4).
The reduction in usury laws has joined
larger changes in credit markets. Lenders
now rely much more on credit scoring and
other such technologies to assess the risk of
particular borrowers, and they have set up
entities to compete for the new subprime
business. Parallel developments have
taken place in markets for auto finance and
credit cards. Many new mortgage brokers
and subprime lenders have emerged, as
have many old-line lenders with subprime
mortgage subsidiaries. Financial regulation
of these new entities is a good deal less
stringent than for the traditional banking
sector.
Another regulatory change that facili-
tated these developments was the 1977
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).
Through the 1980s and 1990s, the CRA
encouraged banks to make low- and 
moderate-income mortgage loans in
redeveloping areas. To their surprise,
banks often found these loans to be prof-
itable. In effect, the CRA opened up new
areas of business to lenders unaware of the
profit possibilities in these low-income
markets. Thus, lending has expanded sig-
nificantly to low- and moderate-income
households. A large share of the new 
loans has financed the new set of low- 
and moderate-income homeowners.
There are other changes as well. The
scope and breadth of community-based
organizations have expanded significantly,
whether they operate on their own or are
tied to national networks such as Neigh-
borworks America or the Opportunity
Finance Network. The Federal Housing
Administration, which guarantees the
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FIGURE 4.  Denial Rates for Conventional Mortgages, 1997–2005 (percent)
Source: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.
mortgages of many first-time homebuyers,
has liberalized its rules. Giant secondary-
market purchasers like Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac have expanded into lower-
income mortgage markets to meet their
new and more stringent housing goals.
Benefits and Costs 
for the New Homeowners
The parallel growth of homeownership
rates and the subprime market suggests
that the new homeowners are drawn
largely from groups formerly excluded
from credit markets. A voluminous litera-
ture has tried to measure the basic benefits
of homeownership. Essentially, these
homeowners save more, build wealth, and
act to improve their neighborhoods. The
biggest problem with this literature is cor-
recting for selection bias—are the new
homeowners benefiting from owning a
home, or would they have benefited any-
way because of innate differences between
them and renters? Did homeownership or
the innate differences cause the gains?
Earlier studies did not correct for this bias
and generally found significant impacts of
homeownership. Some of the newer stud-
ies in this area, beginning about 1990, have
used panel data and other sources to cor-
rect for these biases (Dietz and Haurin
2003). While these new studies still find
positive effects from homeownership, the
impacts are not as large and are sometimes
quite tenuous.
These post-1990 studies can be sum-
marized briefly (Dietz and Haurin 2003).
Homeowners might be expected to save
more—and they seem to—since they have
the self-control mechanism of having to
make their monthly mortgage payments.
Homeowners might also be expected to
build more wealth, both because of any
added saving and the relative rise in house
prices. Here the empirical confirmation is
stronger, especially in areas where house
prices are rising rapidly. Homeowners
might be expected to be less mobile, due to
the higher transaction costs of owning a
home. Here there is strong empirical con-
firmation. They might be expected to work
harder, particularly if they have to stretch
to make their mortgage payments. Here
there seems to be strong evidence that at
least women increase their labor supply.
Homeowners might be expected to invest
more in their home, neighborhood, com-
munity, and children, and to guard more
against crime. There is confirmation of
some of these relationships, though not all.
There is also some empirical evidence of
greater self-reported satisfaction (table 1).
The American Housing Survey per-
mits a more careful look at those buying 
a home for the first time in the 1990s
(Herbert and Belsky 2006). These new
homebuyers seem to be satisfied with their
homes and to have made reasonable pur-
chases from a physical standpoint. Again,
it is hard to verify significant neighbor-
hood improvements. The new homebuyers
have generally put very little money down
on their mortgages, though their interest
rates are only slightly higher than on con-
ventional mortgages. The most troubling
aspect is that many new buyers now face
significant cost burdens, and while they are
not actually going into foreclosure, a high
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TABLE 1. Theoretical and Empirical Impact of Homeownership (Post-1990 articles)
Impact on Theoretical Impact Empirical Confirmation
Household saving Weak positive Weak
Wealth accumulation Strong positive Depends on house prices
Mobility Strong negative Strong
Labor supply Weak positive Reasonable, for women
Property improvements Strong positive Weak
Urban environment Strong positive Weak
Political activity Strong positive Reasonable, on voting
Crime Strong negative Weak
Child outcomes Strong positive Reasonable
Satisfaction Weak positive Reasonable
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share sells their houses after only a
few years.
On the cost side, delinquency and
foreclosure are the dramatic risks.
Studies of the foreclosure problem in
the city of Chicago suggest significant
costs all around (Home Ownership
Preservation Initiative 2006). Home-
owners can lose their property, their
equity, and their chance to build
wealth. Even the lenders do not often
fare well, with a series of servicing
costs. The city loses, particularly
when the property remains vacant
and entails continuing costs. And
neighborhood values go to pot when
surrounding homeowners lose signif-
icant value.
There are more subtle costs as
well. Even though refinancing a sub-
prime mortgage is costly, some home-
owners refinance often, up to several
times a year. A series of terms—loan
flipping, equity stripping—have
come into use to characterize condi-
tions in these markets. Some of these
problems can be attributed to preda-
tory lending and some to the fact that
borrowers may have lost jobs (and
their ability to make their mortgage
payments).
Policy Changes
The country has, in effect, performed
a huge experiment in opening up
housing and mortgage markets to
new groups of homeowners with
marginal credit records, presumably
lower incomes, and a higher repre-
sentation from racial or ethnic minor-
ity groups. The changes are so huge
they are likely to be irreversible—the
country will not likely go back to
homeownership rates of a decade ago
and the subprime mortgage market
will not likely shrink.
From an overall standpoint, this
change would appear to represent a
net social improvement. There seem
to be more gainers than losers, and
unless the losers lose a lot more per
household, the net gains would seem
to outpace the losses. Hence the over-
all net social benefit tally should be
positive. But this is not the best way
to view the change. Rather than eval-
uate the overall change, it makes
more sense to see if there are mea-
sures that could reduce the costs or
enhance the benefits.
An obvious potential policy mea-
sure is improved lending counseling,
now already used by various commu-
nity groups such as Neighborworks
America. Targeted programs such as
these can require that clients enter
lending counseling programs, mak-
ing these clients more selective in tak-
ing on credit and more disciplined in
making mortgage payments. The pro-
grams can give valuable advice when
consumers want to refinance, provide
legal help in disputes, and refinance
loans on terms preferable to those
privately available. But lending coun-
seling might inherently have limited
effectiveness. Mortgage contracts can
be unfathomable even to those with
advanced degrees in finance, and the
notion of universal housing counsel-
ing may be hard to shove down
prospective buyers’ throats. Also,
attempts to establish universal coun-
seling may create an industry of
phony consultants.
Product restrictions might play
some role. Very often subprime, and
even prime, borrowers exhibit what
economists call myopia, where they
are more aware of short-term than
long-term costs. If consumer myopia
is a general problem, it may make
sense to ban balloon payments in 
this market, as the Home Owner-
ship Equity Protection Act of 1994
(HOEPA) already does for very high
cost mortgages. HOEPA also contains
strictures against long-term prepay-
ment penalties, another restriction
that may be appropriate to lessen the
costs of mistakes. Many states have
adopted their own policies, often pat-
terned after the 1994 law, and these
can be extended as well.
Measures could also be taken to
reduce market inefficiencies. The U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) has promoted
the idea of folding all closing costs
into one amount and of informing
the consumer of this total amount in
advance. Such a plan would provide
better market information to con-
sumers, and also give consumers 
a chance to shop around, as they 
do in other areas of the economy. 
Secondary-market purchasers such 
as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
could also use their considerable
leverage to lessen market distortions
and standardize and clarify loan
terms.
Financial lenders in this market
could also be more closely regulated.
Prime mortgage lenders are subject to
arduous bank examinations every
three years, examinations that moni-
tor lending practices, verify borrow-
ers’ incomes, and assess repayment
probabilities. Similar regulations
could be extended to the affiliates of
these prime lenders, and perhaps
even to independent lending com-
panies, the source of most allega-
tions about predatory lending. 
There may also be ways to regulate
mortgage brokers, who are placing
ever-growing shares of subprime
mortgages.
There are also ways to encourage
homeownership on better terms.
HUD has been doing some experi-
mental programs under which ten-
ants’ rent payments are partially
devoted to escrow accounts, to per-
mit the tenants to become owners.
These tenants have to satisfy difficult
conditions to become owners, but the
early experience is that once they do
that, foreclosure rates are much lower
(Lubell 2006). The lesson again seems
to be that some coaching on home-
ownership may pay big dividends.
Conclusion
Wittingly or unwittingly, the United
States has passed through an era of
enormous social change in housing
markets. The mortgage market has
been opened up to millions of poten-
tial new homeowners, and the impli-
cations are huge, for both owners 
An Urban Institute Project Exploring Upward Mobility OPPORTUNITY AND OWNERSHIP
7
and renters. There has been much
research on particular aspects of these
changes but very little in the way of
overall assessment. There has also
been little evaluation of potential pol-
icy changes. It is now time to begin
that process.
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